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SUPPLEMENTAL STATEMENT OF FACTS
ON CROSS-APPEAL
On January 1, 1991, Arrington Construction Company awarded
Urethane the job of applying foam insulation and fire proofing on a
project at the Idaho National Energy Laboratory in Scoville, Idaho
("INEL Job").
John

(R. 3 90)

Arrington

("Arrington"),

the

president

of

Arrington

Construction Company, advised Urethane that Arrington would need a
Performance Bond and a Labor and Materials Bond to ensure Urethanefs
performance of the contract.

(R. 390)

Urethanefs bonding agents required audited financial statements
to issue a bond of the size required for the INEL job. Completing the
financial statements would have taken several weeks and Urethane
needed bonding immediately.

(R. 390)

Because Urethane's work on the INEL job was scheduled to begin
before it could obtain the audited financial statement and because of
Urethanefs financial condition, Ed Kendall decided to ask Utah Foam
to provide bonding. (R. 390-391)
On March 14, 1991 Urethane's president, Edward Kendall approached
Utah Foam's president Bruce Wilson with an urgent matter relating to
Urethane's attempts to obtain a large government construction contract
called the INEL project in Idaho.

Mr. Kendall told both Mr. Wilson

and a bonding agent, Mr. Westover, that Urethane would lose the INEL
contract unless Urethane immediately secured bonding.
341-42)
In his deposition testimony, Mr. Kendall admitted:

1

(R. 324, R.

Q:

When you went into discuss this bonding matter with
Mr. Wilson, you were under some time pressure to
obtain a bond at that point; is that correct?

A:

Yes it was.

Q:

Did you tell him you might lose the job if you didn't
obtain the bond?

A:

I did. I told them that there was a possibility that
we would lose the iob if we didn't obtain the bond and
we needed -- and at that point we needed the bond
virtually immediately. (Emphasis added)

(R. 322)
John Arrington, the general contractor on the INEL project, told
Mr. Kendall that: "if Urethane did not provide a bond," Arrington
would: "start looking for another contractor."

(R. 3 52-54)

As a

result of Mr. Kendall's urgent plea, the parties entered into a joint
venture and Bonding Assistance Agreement whereby Utah Foam would
provide bonding as a joint venture with Urethane on the project.

As

a joint venturer, Utah Foam was entitled to share in 33% of the gross
profits ono the project.

(Appellant's Opening Brief, Addendum 2.)

In order to obtain bonding from Southern American, Utah Foam, its
individual principals and their wives, and its sister company, Ernest
Wilson Company, Inc., were required to execute and submit a General
Indemnity Agreement which both personally guaranteed any liability and
pledged the assets of Utah Foam, Ernest Wilson Company and their
individual principals to indemnify and hold Southern American harmless
against "any and all losses and expenses of whatsoever kind or nature
. . . which the surety [Southern American] may sustain or incur" as
a result of issuing the bonds for Urethane.

2

(R. 363-384)

On March 26, 1991, Southern American issued the required performance, labor and material bonds for Urethane to guarantee its
performance of the contract on the INEL Project.

(R. 357, R. 361)

At the time the bonds were issued, the parties believed that work
on the INEL job would begin in 1991. The job was delayed for over one
year solely because of actions taken by the United States Government.
(R. 392)
On March 30, 1992, the State of Utah issued notice via Western
Union Telegraph that it was placing the bonding company, Southern
American in receivership and that all bonds including the INEL bonds
were cancelled effective April 25, 1992.

(R. 392)

After notification of the cancellation, Utah Foam, its bonding
agent, Mr. Westover, and Urethane all took steps to respond to the
cancellation by attempting to obtain replacement bonds.

(R. 3 92)

Shortly after notice of the bond cancellation and prior to the
effective date materials for the Urethane contract were received at
the job site (R. 507-08) and Urethane commenced work on the project.
Utah Foam continued its efforts to secure the replacement bonding
through American Bonding.

The only items needed to secure the

replacement bonding was Urethane's cooperation in providing (1) a
current bank letter updating a similar bank letter that Westover sent
to Southern American to get the first set of bonds; (2) a letter from
Urethane's attorney confirming Kendall's statement to Westover that
Urethane had settled the dispute involving an old judgment that
reflected adversely on Urethane's credit report; (3) return of a
simple affidavit form that was to be signed and filled out by
Arrington verifying Urethane's status and progress on the INEL
3

project. American Bonding was prepared to issue the bonds if Urethane
supplied these three simple items.

(R. 326)

Urethanefs President, Kendall, communicated with Wilson and
bonding agent, David Westover, frequently about obtaining replacement
bonds until shortly after Urethane began construction work on the INEL
Project. At that time, Kendall ceased communicating with Westover and
Wilson.

(R. 325, R. 343-44)

Unbeknownst to Utah Foam and in approximately June of 1992, Ed
Kendall approached Arrington and contrary to the facts, stated that
Utah Foam was having difficulty obtaining a replacement bond.
Q:

Did there come a time when you decided not to
require replacement bonds from Urethane Company
of Utah?

A:

Yes.

Q:

Tell me how that came about and when it was, if
you can fix the date, a time?

A:

Well, shortly after receiving this cancellation
of the bond, we received the material. Urethane
of Utah moved on-site, brought their equipment to
the job site and their personnel and started
spraying and appeared that they were capable of
doing this contract.
Their quality was
excellent. The relationship between Arrington
and Urethane and the construction manager was
excellent. The workmanship was excellent, and
during that time period we started to feel more
comfortable with them that they could easily
finish this contract.
And their performance
indicated to us that maybe we didn't need a bond.
There was also some question about additional
cost for the bond, whether we should incur that
cost in view of their actual performance.
So we tentatively made a decision that we
probably would not insist on a bond to finish the
job. They were actually underway and performing
well.

Q:

Do you know when that decision was made by you?
4

A:

it wasnft overnight. It was probably over a time
period.

Q:

Did you inform Urethane Company of that?

A:

Probably, yes. I think Ed told me he was having
some difficulty getting replacement bonds, and so
I said "Well, we're willing to accept your
performance on this project to continue without
a bond."

(R. 508-510, R. 519-520)
Based upon Kendallfs statement, Urethanefs performance on the job
and the additional cost of obtaining bonding, Arrington waived the
requirement of replacement bonds and Urethane was then permitted to
complete its work on the project without replacement bonds.

(R. 383-

94)
On July 9, 1992, Urethane sent to Utah Foam Check No. 5823 in the
amount of $38,581.25 as payment for Invoice No. 34299 dated 5/5/92.
Invoice No. 34299 from Utah Foam to Urethane was for $27,840.45 for
materials supplied on the INEL job and $10,740.80 to be applied as
payment under the Bonding Assistance Agreement.

(R. 539)

That Urethane's Check No. 5823 was returned for insufficient
funds and was ultimately replaced with a cashier's check in the amount
of

$35,000 with

the difference

Urethane's account.

of

$3,581.25

being

charged

to

(R. 53 9)

On July 29, 1992, Urethane sent Check No. 44708 as payment on
Invoice No. 34502 in the amount of $18,965.63.

Invoice No. 34502 was

for $13,390 for materials supplied on the INEL job and $5,575.63 to
be applied as payment under the Bonding Assistance Agreement.

Utah

Foam returned the $5,575.63 at Kendall's request in order to assist

5

Urethane in making payroll with the understanding that it would be
repaid from the proceeds on the INEL job.

(R. 53 9)

Utah Foam sent Urethane a letter on August 10, 1992 reflecting
the application of the funds to the different debts. Urethane did not
dispute

any application

of

funds under

the Bonding

Assistance

Agreement until February 10, 1993, when Utah Foam received a letter
from Ed Kendall.

(R. 539-40)

As the result of Utah Foam's assistance to Urethane in obtaining
the original bond for the INEL project, and assisting Urethane in
finding replacement bonds for over two months, Urethane was able to
complete

the contract

and receive the total contract price of

approximately $550,000. Despite having received all that it bargained
for and despite the fact that Utah Foam had done everything it
promised in assisting Urethane to obtain bonding to get and complete
the project, Urethane refused to pay Utah Foam the agreed upon 33% of
profits pursuant to the parties agreement.

The lower court properly

found as a matter of law that Utah Foam was entitled to its agreed
upon share of the profits and entered judgment accordingly.
In order to further deny Utah Foam its share of profits, Ed
Kendall, prior to the court entering judgment, set about to render
Urethane insolvent, filed a Chapter 7 Bankruptcy, and transferred the
assets of Urethane to a new business operated in the name of his son.
Due to the lower court's erroneous ruling on Ed Kendall's personal
guarantee, Ed Kendall has successfully received profits rightfully
belonging to Utah Foam, has removed those profits from Urethane and
thereby denied Utah Foam monies to which it is entitled.

6

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
REPLY ARGUMENTS

I.

Urethane properly argues that the court should give the term

"all obligations" its fair import and meaning.
import

Applying the fair

&nd meaning to the Kendalls personal guarantee of "all

obligations" of Urethane to Utah Foam results in the Kendalls having
personally guaranteed Urethane's obligation to Utah Foam under the
Bonding Assistance Agreement.
II.

Urethane's argument that the Kendalls personal guarantee

should be disfavored and limited as a type of dragnet clause has been
rejected by the Utah courts.

A personal guarantee is not a dragnet

clause and will be given force and effect according to its terms.
III. Both Utah Foam and Urethane treated the Bonding Assistance
obligation as properly falling under the parties open account.
Urethane made several progress payments on invoices billed under the
open account.

It was not until seven months after the invoices and

partial payments that Urethane changed its mind and took a contrary
position.
IV.

Urethane received the full benefit of its bargain with Utah

Foam including the bargained for consideration.

Utah Foam provided

Urethane with the requested assistance to obtain bonding as bargained
for under the agreement.

The fact that Urethane negotiated a waiver

of the need for replacement bonding after the state cancelled the
earlier bonds does not constitute failure of consideration.
received the full benefit of its bargain.

7

Urethane

V.

It would be unfair and inequitable if Urethane were to keep

Utah Foam's agreed upon share of the gross profits. Utah Foam did all
it agreed to do and was asked to do by Urethane.

Urethane completed

the job and received everything it bargained for including the
approximate $250,000 in gross profits.

Utah Foam is entitled to its

agreed upon share of the gross profits in the amount of $65,000.
VI.

The Bonding Assistance Agreement created a joint venture

between Urethane and Utah Foam. As a joint venturer, Urethane was in
a fiduciary relationship with Utah Foam and any advantage Urethane was
able to negotiate with Arrington to waive the need for replacement
bonds enured to the benefit of the joint venture including Utah Foam.

I.
REPLY ARGUMENT ON PERSONAL GUARANTEES
A.

Urethane

Applying the "Fair Import" of the Terms Used in the
Guarantee Agreement
Can Only Result in a Finding of
the Kendalls1 Personal Liability,
correctly

argues

in its brief

that

a

court, in

interpreting a contract, should enforce the "fair import of its
terms."

(Appellees Brief at 7) Urethane proceeds, however, to argue

in its brief that this court should ignore this enunciated rule of law
and render an interpretation of the term "all obligations" as stating
something other than its "fair import."
The fallacy in Urethane's argument
Urethane's own brief at page 8.

is best

illustrated

in

In attempting to argue that the

guarantee should not extend beyond obligations arising under the
credit agreement, Urethane omitted the word "all" in its quote at the
8

bottom of the page. The omission of the word "all" preceding the word
"obligations" evidences Urethane's attempts to rewrite the terms of
the guarantee and convince the court that the word "all" is either
meaningless or non-existent

in the agreement.

Indeed, without

omitting the word "all" in its quotation, Urethane could not convince
even itself of its position.
The strength of Utah Foam's argument that the personal guarantee
extended

to Urethane's obligation under the Bonding Assistance

Agreement is best illustrated by correcting Urethane's quotation at
the bottom of page 8 to properly read, " [T]he guarantee applies to
x

[all] obligations of the purchaser,' and continues 'as long as there

are extensions of credit'".
terms can only result

Applying the fair import of the above

in the interpretation that the Kendalls

guaranteed "all obligations" of Urethane to Utah Foam.
The

cases

cited by Urethane

in support

of

their general

statements of law do not support Urethane's argument that the Kendalls
should escape personal liability in this case.

Indeed, in the cases

cited by Urethane, Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. V. University
Anclote, Inc., 764 F.2d 804 (11th Cir. 1985), Bernardi Brothers, Inc.
v. Great Lakes Distributing, Inc., 712 F.2d 1205 (7th Cir. 1983) and
Paul Revere Protective Life Insurance Co. V. Weis, 53 5 F. Supp. 3 79
(E.D. Pa. 1981), the personal guarantors were found liable despite the
language cited by Urethane.
The Newton and Rohn cases cited by Urethane are inapposite as
they are distinguished on the grounds that the obligations at issue
were not primary obligations of the debtor to which the guarantee ran.
In those two cases, the court ruled that the guarantees of the wives
9

for their husbands' obligations did not extend to their husbands7
guarantee of obligations of third parties (i.e., their sons).

Those

facts are clearly distinguishable from the facts in this case and
neither party has argued that the obligation of Urethane was anything
other than a primary obligation.
Clearly, applying the fair import of the term "all obligations"
such as was done in the two Utah cases of Valley Bank and North Park,
cited in Utah Foam's initial brief, renders the Kendalls liable
pursuant

to their personal guarantee agreement and the court's

interpretation otherwise was erroneous.
B.

The Kendalls Personal Guarantee Is Not a "Dragnet Clause".

Urethane, in its effort to convince the court to unduly limit the
scope of the personal guarantee, urges the court to treat the personal
guarantee as a "dragnet clause" in a security agreement.

As such,

Urethane argues that personal guarantees should not be favored by the
courts.

(Urethane's brief at 12) Urethane's reliance upon a dragnet

clause analysis is misplaced and contrary to the established law of
Utah.
A dragnet clause is a provision in a mortgage in which a
mortgagor gives security for past and future advances as well as
present indebtedness. Black's Law Dictionary, 443 (5th ed. 1979) The
case relied upon by Urethane for drawing its dragnet clause analysis
is North Park Bank of Commerce v. Nichols, 645 P.2d 620 (Utah 1982).
The Utah Supreme Court in that case specifically rejected the personal
guarantor's attempts to persuade the court to treat his personal
guarantee of "any and all obligations" as a dragnet clause. The court
stated:
10

Neither the First Security Bank case nor the
Heath Tecna case supports Bottum's [guarantor's]
position. Neither of those cases dealt with a
loan guarantee agreement; each included, rather,
the interpretation of standard printed language
in a security agreement reciting that the
collateral secured all present and future debts.
Id. at 621.
Further, the court went on to clarify that in neither of the two
cited cases did the court pronounce
unenforceable.

Id. at 622.

future advance clauses as

The court went on to find that the

personal guarantor's agreement "clearly specified his obligation to
guarantee Nichols present and future obligations to plaintiff."

Id.

at 622.
Urethane's reliance upon a dragnet clause limitation is misplaced
and contrary to the law enunciated in North Park.

Clearly, had the

Kendalls wished to limit their liability under the guarantee to only
the credit agreement as now argued, they could have easily done so by
placing words of limitation such as "obligations incurred under the
credit agreement."

No such limitations were requested and the lower

court erred in retrospectively implying such limitations contrary to
the express terms of the parties agreement.
C.

Urethane's Contention That Utah Foam Never Treated the
Obligation Under the Bonding Assistance Agreement as Part
of the Open Account is Inaccurate.

Urethane goes to great length in its brief to dispute the
assertion that Utah Foam treated the obligation owing under the
Bonding Assistance Agreement as part of the open account.

Utah Foam

did treat the obligation under the Bonding Assistance Agreement as due
and owing under the open account.
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Utah Foam's president testified that originally he intended to
treat progress payments as miscellaneous cash (R. 451), however, Utah
Foam had prepared and sent invoices to Urethane which invoices were
both for materials purchased and progress payments on the INEL job.
R. 513-514, 53 9) It was not until over seven months later that
Urethane disputed the obligation invoiced under the open account. R.
542) It is interesting to note that Urethane during the performance
of the INEL contract made two progress payments to Utah Foam on
invoices under the open account (albeit one of the checks bounced),
without any protest.

It was not until seven months later and after

Urethane had received the entire profits of approximately $250,000
that it first decided to advise Utah Foam that it was now contesting
both Utah Foam's invoices and the obligation itself.
Urethane's reference to the colloquy in the June 9, 1995 hearing
regarding the nature of the obligation outstanding as supporting an
argument that Utah Foam did not consider the Bonding Assistance
obligation as falling under the open account is factually flawed.
Prior to the hearing, the court had already entered an order finding
Urethane liable under the Bonding Assistance Agreement.

The issue

being discussed at the hearing was whether an approximate $10,000
payment had been properly applied towards materials purchased or had
been applied towards the Bonding Assistance obligation.

Counsel for

Utah Foam simply clarified that the genesis of the outstanding
obligation was the $65,000 due under the Bonding Assistance Agreement
and that Utah Foam was not going to get bogged down as to whether the
$10,000 payment should have been applied towards materials or the
bonding obligation.
12

Clearly, Utah Foam intended and did treat the progress payments
under the Bonding Assistance Agreement as part of the open account.
Urethane did not contest that characterization until seven months
later when it decided to keep all the profits to itself.

To the

extent the determination of whether the personal guarantees reach the
Bonding Assistance obligation rests upon a finding of intent of the
parties as to whether they treated the obligation as falling under the
open account, the facts, taken in the light most favorable to Utah
Foam, would support a finding of intent to treat the obligation as
encompassed under the open account and the lower court erred in
granting summary judgment in favor of Urethane on that issue.
II.
RESPONSIVE ARGUMENT ON APPELLEES CROSS-APPEAL
The Lower Court Properly Found Urethane Liable Under the
Bonding Assistance Agreement
Despite the fact that Utah Foam performed its obligations under
the Bonding Assistance Agreement in every respect, Urethane asserts
by cross-appeal that it had no obligation to pay Utah Foam because it
was ultimately able to persuade Arrington to waive the requirement for
a replacement bond.

The following facts are critical:

(1) Urethane approached Utah Foam in the
requesting its assistance in obtaining a bond;

first

place

(2) Urethane needed the bond immediately to avoid having
its bid rejected and lose the INEL Project to another
contractor;
(3) Urethane proposed Utah Foam receive a one-third share
of gross profits if Utah Foam helped Urethane keep the INEL
Project by helping Urethane secure a bond;
(4) Utah Foam and Earnest Wilson Company, Inc, their
principals and their wives all furnished extensive financial and
credit information and provided security for Urethanefs
13

Performance Bond by pledging assets; bonds then were issued in
the face amount of $491,588 for the Performance Bond and in the
face amount of $491,588 for the Labor and Material Bond;
(5) Utah Foam, Ernest Wilson Company, Utah Foam's
principals and their wives all signed General Indemnity
Agreements pledging their respective corporate and individual
assets to enable Urethane to obtain the bonding and ensure that
Urethane get the construction contract;
(6) Plaintiff, its principals and their wives pledged
themselves to liability and exposure of up to $983,000 under the
terms of the General Indemnity Agreement;
(7) Utah Foam f s assets, and that of its principals, were
pledged, committed and unavailable for other business purposes
for approximately one (1) year before Southern American's bond
was cancelled by the State of Utah.
Urethane got exactly what it bargained for under the terms of the
Agreement.

Having received and used the benefits of the Agreement,

Urethane's argument that it should be allowed to escape its obligation
to pay the one-third

share of gross profits promised

Agreement was properly rejected by the court.

under

the

The mere fact that

Urethane was somehow able to obtain Arrington's waiver of replacement
bonds, does not operate as a release of its obligation to pay for Utah
Foam's assistance in getting the bonds for the contract to perform the
work on the INEL project.
A.

Urethane received the full value and bargained for
consideration under the Bonding Assistance Agreement.

Urethane attempts to mislead the Court into believing that the
central, underlying purpose of the Bonding Assistance Agreement was
to provide bonding throughout the course of the INEL construction
period.

However, the written terms of the contract, and the testimony

of Arrington, Wilson and Kendall unequivocally demonstrate that the
central purpose of the Bonding Assistance Agreement was not to provide
bonding for the duration of the construction, but to assist Urethane

14

in obtaining a Payment and Performance Bond to keep Arrington from
hiring another subcontractor to construct the INEL Project.
The Bonding Assistance Agreement itself provides, in pertinent
part, that: "As of March 13, 1991, Urethane Co. Of Utah is unable to
bond

this project

assistance. "

and has asked Utah Foam Products, Inc. for

(R. 456)

The stated purpose of the contract is to

provide bonding assistance because Urethane was unable to bond the
project as of March 13, 1991. The uncontraverted testimony reflects
that:
1.

Arrington was going to look for another subcontractor
unless Urethane immediately bonded the job. (R. 355-56)

2.

Urethane was unable to bond the job and immediately needed
Utah Foam's assistance. (R. 456, R. 322)

3.

Kendall told Westover that Urethane would lose the job
unless they got Utah Foam's assistance. (R. 3 07-08)

4.

Utah Foam performed its obligations under the contract and
did, in fact, assist Urethane in obtaining a bond.

After rendering bonding assistance to Urethane in March 1991,
Utah Foam had no further obligations under the Bonding Assistance
Agreement unless requested.

The mere fact that Urethane did not later

need bonding assistance after Urethane obtained the waiver in the
summer of 1992, does not affect Urethane's obligation to pay under the
Agreement for Utah Foam's bonding assistance in March 1991.
In Copper State Leasing Co. v. Blacker Appliance & Furniture Co.,
770 P.2d 88 (Utah 1988), the Court held that if the language of a
contract is unambiguous, the court can, as a matter of law, interpret
the contract, including the contract's definition of the consideration
supporting the contract.

Consideration is an "act or promise,

bargained for and given in exchange for a promise . . .
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For the

mutual promises of the parties to a bilateral contract to constitute
the consideration for each other, the promises must be binding on both
parties

. . .

Failure of consideration

[as opposed to lack of

consideration] exists 'wherever one is either given or promised to
give some performance fails without his fault to receive in some
material respect the agreed exchange for that performance.'" id. At
91.
The parties' testimony and the contract language inescapably
leads to the conclusion that the central purpose of the Bonding
Assistance Agreement was to assist Urethane in obtaining a bond to
keep from losing the INEL project. Once Urethane obtained a bond and
was allowed to begin construction of the project, the material terms
of the contract were performed and payment under the contract should
be enforced as a matter of law.

Although defendants go into great

detail about the fact that they did not ultimately need a replacement
bond, Urethane had already received the full value of Utah Foam's
bonding assistance: that is, they got a bond and started work on the
INEL project.
There is no genuine dispute of fact that Arrington did not waive
the requirement of a replacement bond until Kendall told him that he
was having difficulty replacing the bond and after Urethane had
started construction on the INEL project in the first place.

Simply

stated, the issue of a replacement bond and waiver of the bond is
immaterial and a red herring.1
1

Contrary to defendant's argument, there is absolutely
nothing in the contract language or testimony that suggests that
the "very object of the Agreement was defeated" when the bonds were
cancelled and not replaced.
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Failure of consideration is an affirmative defense that must be
established by the defendant.

Bentley v. Potter, 647 P. 2d 617 (Utah

1984) . In the instant case, Urethane received everything it bargained
for.

The fact that the consideration may, in hindsight, be viewed by

Urethane as worthless or of little value because of an unexpected
occurrence is not a failure of consideration.

Konecko v. Konecko, 330

P.2d 393 (Cal. App. 1958).2
Moreover, the defense of failure of consideration cannot be
allowed

where, as here, Urethane

implicitly,

if not

expressly

orchestrated Arrington's waiver of the requested replacement bond
requirement.

It is well established that a person cannot avoid

liability for the performance of its obligation by placing such
obligation beyond his control by his own voluntary act.

Cannon v.

Stevens School of Business, Inc., 560 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1977).

It is

abundantly clear that the replacement bond requirement was waived by
Arrington for a number of reasons including the fact that Kendall told
Arrington he was having "difficulty" in obtaining a replacement bond
as well as the additional cost to Arrington, and the fact that
Urethane was already on the job and performing in a satisfactory
manner. Under the circumstances, the lower court properly found that
Urethane would not be allowed to evade payment under the contract when
it actively participated in obtaining a waiver of a replacement bond.
2

An occurrence or contingency which occurs after the time
of entering the contract must result in a material failure of
performance by one party. Copper State Leasing Co. v. Blacker
Appliance & Furniture Co., supra. See Benson v. Andrews, 292 P.2d
39 (Cal. App. 1955).
The fact that Arrington waived the
requirement of a replacement bond a year after the contract does
not constitute a material failure of performance of the Bonding
Assistance Agreement.
17

B.

The lower court agreed that it would be unfair and
unequitable to allow Urethane to obtain value under the
contract without paying Utah Foam the agreed upon
consideration•

Urethane received everything it bargained for under the Bonding
Assistance Agreement.

Incredibly, Urethane asserts that it would be

unfair and inequitable for Utah Foam to receive one-third or $65,000
of the profits in this case when: (1) Ed Kendall is a sophisticated
businessman who has obtained numerous construction bonds over the
years;

(2) Urethane approached Utah Foam desperately seeking its

immediate help; and (3) Mr. Kendall himself proposed Utah Foam receive
one-third of gross profits.

This Court should affirm the lower

court's rejection of Kendall's cynical ploy to escape a payment
obligation he himself proposed and negotiated at arm's length with
Utah Foam.
Indeed, it would be unfair and inequitable for any Court to rewrite the contract between the parties and thereby rob Utah Foam of
the benefit of its bargain.

Utah Foam's bonding assistance made it

possible for Urethane to keep this $500,000 job.

"[I]t is not up to

the Court to rewrite a contract improvidently entered into at arm's
length or to change the bargain indirectly on the basis of supposed
equitable principles."

Dalton v. Jerico Construction Co., 642 P.2d

748, 758 (Utah 1982); accord Hal Taylor Assocs. v. Unionamerica, Inc.,
657 P.2d 743, 749 (Utah 1982).
C.

Urethane admitted Utah Foam was a joint venture partner and
the lower Court properly found that any waiver of a
contract requirement by Arrington would enure to the
benefit of both the joint venturers.

In the briefing below, Urethane admitted that the Bonding
Assistance Agreement was intended and did create a joint venture
18

between Urethane and Utah Foam on the INEL project.

(R. 405) The Utah

Supreme Court has defined the relationship of joint venturers as
follows:
[4] The relationship between joint adventurers is
fiduciary in character, and imposes upon all the
participants an obligation of loyalty and of the
utmost good faith, fairness, and honesty in their
dealings with each other with respect to the
matters pertaining to the enterprise.
Lynch v. MacDonald, 367 P.2d 464, 468 (Utah 1962).
It necessarily follows in accordance with Urethane's fiduciary
relationship with Utah Foam, that any waiver of a replacement bond
negotiated by Urethane enured to the benefit of the joint venture and
did not in any way affect the agreed upon sharing of profits as set
forth in the Bonding Assistance Agreement.
The lower court was correct in finding that the waiver of the
replacement bond did not effect Urethane's obligation to pay Utah Foam
one-third of the gross profits from the project.
CONCLUSION
A plain reading of the personal guarantee executed by the
Kendalls shows that they guaranteed "all obligations" of Urethane to
Utah Foam.

There is no language in the agreement limiting the

guarantee to only obligations arising under the credit agreement.
Applying the fair import of the terms used, all obligations, can only
result in a finding that the Kendalls guaranteed Urethane's obligation
to Utah Foam under the Bonding Assistance Agreement and the lower
court erred in granting the Kendalls' motion for summary judgment on
their personal guarantees.
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Utah Foam fully performed all its obligations under the Bonding
Assistance Agreement and Urethane received all that it bargained for
including the total gross profits of approximately $250,000.

Utah

Foam stood ready, willing and able to assist Urethane in obtaining
replacement bonds if necessary and Urethane's negotiation of a waiver
of replacement bonds enured to the benefit of both parties as joint
venturers.

Clearly there was no failure of consideration and the

lower court's granting of summary judgment on Urethane's obligation
should be affirmed.
DATED this oc

fi

day of March, 1998.
Respectfully submitted,
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